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Christ: The Mystery of God Truly Made Manifest? 
Leontius of Byzantium and the Univocity of Being 
 
Introduction 
 
The goal of this paper is to come to an understanding Leontius’ of Byzantium’s programmatic 
attempt to harmonize Trinitarian and Christological terminology. Helpful for this endeavor 
will be the passage in Leontius’ work on your handout, where he gives an argument for the 
consistency of the terms of ousia and hypostasis in Christological and Trinitarian thought 
(oikonomia and theologia; PG 86/2, 1921B-1924B). The questions this paper would like to 
address are: Does Leontius have some sort of ontology that underlies his use of the term ousia 
and what would it look like according to the passage we will investigate? Answering these 
questions will allow us to catch a glimpse of how human and divine natures relate, how Christ 
manifests God in Leontius’ theology and what his ontology implies for the transcendence of 
God. To this end, we have to first give a short and sharply reduced account of Leontius’ 
concept of ousia. In a second step this concept has to be illustrated with the help of Leontius’ 
anthropology, which he constructs from Trinitarian Theology as well as Christology, leading 
to certain tensions in his system that Leontius is keen on mediating. In a third step we will 
analyze the passage on your handout illustrating Leontius’ attempt at a mediation.  
 
Remarks on Leontius’ usage of ousia 
 
Generally speaking, Leontius’ fundamental concern was to hold the terms ousia and 
hypostasis apart, in order to solve the problem of unity and difference in Christ befalling 
Theologians in his time. This ranks him among the strict Chalcedonians. In a famous passage 
from the beginning of his treatise against the Nestorians and the Eutychians, Leontius uses the 
term enypostatos to further qualify the ousiai of Christ.1 Researchers have long debated the 
meaning of this term in Leontius. Roughly speaking we can say that there are two meanings 
possible: either enypostatos means something like “really existent” or “truly real”, as it has 
been used in traditional Trinitarian thought for the person of the Son; or Leontius of 
Byzantium is one of the first if not the first thinker who expressed the idea of an insubsistence 
of the natures of Christ in his hypostasis by the term enypostatos, a usage that so called Neo-
Chalcedonian authors like Leontius of Jerusalem and Maximus the Confessor, who were 
intent of harmonizing Chalcedon with Cyril of Alexandria’s Christology, have later on 
developed more fully.  
 
At any rate, in the passage of Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos (CNE)he calls the ousia a 
pragma hyfestws, a subsistent, a real thing. It seems that he is expressing the same thing with 
the term enypostatos. By opposing ousia and accidents, which only have being in another 
thing, whereas the ousia has being in itself and can theoretically be considered in itself, 
Leontius emphasizes the reality of the ousia. Furthermore, as Benjamin Gleede has remarked, 
textual evidence from his Epilysis2 shows that Leontius did not fully adhere to the so called 
Neo-Chalcedonian school of thought that taught a certain kind of insubsistence of Christ’s 
human nature in the Logos.3 Leontius seems to think that the Neo-Chalcedonians consider the 
hypostasis of the Logos as in some way affected due to the assumption of a human nature: In 
                                                 
1 Leontius of Byzantium, Contra Nestorianos et Eutychianos, PG 86/2, 1277C-1280A.  
2 Id., Epilysis, PG 86/2, 1944C.  
3 Benjamin Gleede, The Development of the Term ἐνυπόστατος from Origen to John of Damascus 
(Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2012), 61.  
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that view, he says, a hypostasis is made out of two natures.4 Leontius of Jerusalem and 
Maximus the Confessor would call this a composite hypostasis.  
 
For the Byzantine Leontius, this sort of Neo-Chalcedonian insubsistence affords the ousia 
with too little, almost accidental reality as it receives its being from the hypostasis. Contrarily, 
he emphasizes that the human ousia of Christ is a real, existent thing in the first place. Of 
course, this is first and foremost a point against the so-called Eutychians or rather the 
Severian Monophysites, who argue that the human ousia of Christ is dissolved into a unity 
with his divine ousia.  
 
Addressing the Nestorians, Leontius makes the point that, even though the human ousia is 
real and exists as a fixed unity, it never subsists by itself as a particular, which it only does in 
the hypostasis. In conclusion of this section we can tentatively say that for Leontius an ousia 
does have a certain ontological reality which is not just theoretical, but at the same time it 
exists together with or in a hypostasis. Now we will see how he applies this thinking 
concretely in his anthropology.  
 
Anthropology 
 
Given the fixity and complete unity of what Leontius denotes by the term “ousia”, scholarship 
has clearly perceived the tensions befalling Leontius’ anthropology.5 Constructing the human 
being as an analogy to the hypostatic union in Christ, Leontius differentiates very clearly 
between the two complete substances (ousiai) of body and soul, as in Christ’s person the 
divine and the human natures are real and complete. His monophysite opponents strongly 
criticized this sort of analogy, since it would force the theologian to speak of three natures or 
ousiai in Christ: body, soul and divinity.  
 
Leontius is thus challenged to argue for the unity of the human being while at the same time 
asserting that body and soul are somehow fixed and complete substances in themselves. His 
first attempt at an answer to the Monophysites is to simply apply again the Christological 
model of the hypostatic union to the unity of body and soul in the human person. Since the 
two substances are united in one hypostasis, the human being is factually always one. This 
argument, however, does not touch on Leontius’ anthropological presuppositions that still 
necessitate speaking of three natures in Christ. Consequently, Leontius is forced to argue for 
the unity of body and soul with the term one ousia.  
 
In CNE 1289D-1292C we read his answer:  
 
Leontius starts with a general logical principle: Particulars (hypostaseis) participate in general 
notions (ousiai) while general notions are predicated of particulars. Then, Leontius defines the 
term “one (human) nature” as a general notion: the whole human species, meaning the entire 
collection of all future and past particular humans – a collective universal. To make this 
clearer, we could structure Leontius’ argument as follows:  
 
Premise 1: “One human nature” can be defined as the single whole of the human species.  
Premise 2: The whole of the human species is a collective universal comprising all human 
beings, future and past.  
Premise 3: Any common reality or term can be predicated of its individual instances.  
                                                 
4 Epil., 1944C.  
5 See the papers on Leontius by Marcel Richard.  
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Premise 4: The particular human being is an instance of the whole of the common human 
nature.  
Premise 5: The whole is fully in its parts.  
Conclusion: The “one human nature” as a collective universal can be predicated of any 
particular human being.  
 
The subtleness of the argument lies in the change of the definition of the term ousia from 
expressing the ontological unity of body and soul to denoting the unity of the entire human 
species, just as Gregory of Nyssa did in his Ad Ablabium for the divine nature and the human 
nature.6 This does not change the fact that, on the level of the particular human being, the 
term ousia is used by Leontius to denote body and soul as two distinct ousiai. This manifests 
clearly the problems that Platonist anthropology poses for an integration of Christology and 
Trinitarian Theology. Leontius’ solution does not quite satisfy, due to the ambivalence of the 
term ousia he has to burden his system with.  
 
Concluding this second section we could say that Leontius’ anthropology proves to be fluid. 
According to the exigencies of the debate, he constructs the human being either through a 
Christological lens or from a Trinitarian viewpoint, not quite arriving at a consistent meaning 
for the term ousia. Perhaps we can see better that Leontius uses the fluctuation of the term 
ousia in his Anthropology as a terminological hinge between theologia and oikonomia, and it 
is not quite clear whether this is a result of his fluctuation between Logic and Ontology.  
 
Univocity of Being? 1921B-1924B 
 
The question we have to address in the third section of this paper is: How did Leontius try to 
arrive at a consistent view of the term ousia after all? It seems he wrote his Epilysis after he 
he was pressed on the issue by a Severian interlocutor who seemed versed in Gregory of 
Nyssa’s Contra Eunomium. The interlocutor asks 
 
“Akephalos: Granted, in Trinitarian Theology the hypostasis and the ousia or 
nature are not the same. However, in Christology they are identical with each 
other. For if, according to the divine Gregory, the novelty of the mystery [of the 
Incarnation] renewed the natures, I think it will also renew the appellations, so 
that according to him the principle and the definitions of each will fit with the 
others.” 
 
 
If we draw the out the implications of that statement, the Severian seems to say that having a 
Christology and an Anthropology consistent with each other is argumentatively much more 
convincing than positing a unified terminology for theologia and oikonomia at the cost of a 
fluid meaning of the term ousia in anthropology. In his response, Leontius interestingly 
avoids the use of his fluid anthropology and argues very differently for the consistency of the 
term ousia in the whole of theology:  
 
“Orthodoxos: Does this not surpass I don’t know which excess of folly? For the 
definitions of things are predicated univocally of things of the same genus as well 
as of things belonging to the same species, as people prove who are versed in 
these matters. Since everything that shares in the term ousia will also share in the 
                                                 
6 See the work of Johannes Zachhuber, Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa. Philosophical Background and 
Theological Significance (Leiden: Brill, 200).  
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definition of it, even if the differences of ousiai are countless. When defining 
ousia simply, we should say that it denotes the existence of something. For we say 
that God and angel and human being and living thing and plant exist as an ousia, 
and the concept of the ousia is commonly assigned to all, as it shows the existence 
of these things, not what they are or how they exist, which the proper definitions 
of each thing manifest. The categories show that this is the case; they are 
predicated univocally of subordinated genera.  
 
[Also, Genera as well as specific differences are predicated of species and 
individuals. Things take part equally in ousia and in being a living thing, which 
can be embodied as well as bodiless, rational as well as a-rational, sensible and 
intelligible, and [they do not share] in one more and the other less, but equally and 
commonly and, in short, as part of their definition.  
 
In demonstrative treatises, the circular proof has also been falsified in another 
way. For it acts similar to someone who propounds an argument, and then puts 
forth himself as a witness of this said argument, and urges that it is credible since 
he himself has said so.] 
 
Accordingly, if the proofs in the Fathers concerning the life-giving and holy 
Trinity and concerning the great plan of the God-Logos, one of the Trinity, did not 
come forth and are not advanced now from the general principles and definitions 
of the ousia and the hypostasis, or the person and the nature, then any treatise will 
be absurd and not demonstrative. For someone should give a reason, why 
hypostasis and ousia, or nature and person define and indicate the common and 
the proper [aspects] in Trinitarian Theology, but that this would not be fitting to 
be the case in Christology.  
 
For saying that, due to the newness of the mystery these concepts are defined 
differently in Trinitarian Theology and differently in Christology is first of all an 
action of ignorant people, because the most mysterious of all mysteries is God 
himself, who is hidden together with the Seraphim, and to whom, as the great 
Gregory said, such mysteries refer. Every act of speaking should rightfully be 
silent about him and every intellectual movement should seize, as it has arrived at 
what is beyond word and intellect.  
 
But the manifest mystery of the hidden realities of God is more manifest than the 
hidden mysteries in such a degree, as what is beyond nature has entered into what 
is visible in nature. Now, is only the definition of the hypostasis and the ousia 
renewed in the Incarnation, or also every [other] utterance and every name and 
speech? And what absurdity, if only their definition is renewed and not also the 
definitions of all the others as well? However, at any rate this does not possess 
any ground in reality and therefore makes no sense, as the Great Basil said.” 
 
After reading this long passage we cannot go into all the details but we will summarily say 
that Leontius opposes univocity and equivocity. He accuses his opponents of adhering to a 
pure equivocity of terms in Christology and Trinitarian Theology by separating the terms 
from their definitions. Thus, equivocity negates the true manifestation of the divine in the 
manifest mystery of Christ. Naturally, for Leontius as well as for the Severian interlocutor, 
God in himself is hidden and beyond word, intellect and nature. However, for Leontius this 
God has truly revealed himself in Christ and thus we must speak in univocal terms of the 
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Trinity and Christ. He achieves the univocity of God and the world by subsuming all beings 
(God, angels, human beings etc.) under one single definition of existence as such, which ousia 
stands for when defined simply.  
 
In this respect, Leontius falls short of Ps-Dionysius’ strong language for the transcendence of 
God as beyond ousia or being, even though he knows his writings and quotes him even by 
name.7 Leontius seems to make a bit of a desperate move here and puts all beings and God 
under the same category of existence as such. In this, Leontius even found a successor in 
Duns Scotus, who also holds a univocal concept of being, ens, for God and the world. A few 
questions are in order to point to the problems of Leontius’ view: Is the transcendence of God 
not corrupted if he is put in the same genus of existence as the world? Does not the world then 
somehow share in God’s uncreated and eternal being, as both share the same sort of 
existence? This would remind us of the Origenist doctrine of the fall of beings from some sort 
of unity with God. Can Leontius’ univocal use of the term ousia still fully affirm the 
distinction of the created and the uncreated existence, which was so important for example to 
Athanasius as well as Ps-Dionysius and in turn, Maximus the Confessor? Part of an answer to 
these questions has to be given by an analysis of the relation between predicative logic and 
ontology in Leontius which I cannot serve with here. At any rate, we have a sense now for the 
task of later authors so diverse as John Philoponus and Maximus the Confessor to reject Ps-
Dionysius or integrate him into a Theology that holds together both transcendence and true 
manifestation of God without falling into the simple alternative between univocity and 
equivocity. Maximus, in my view, will come forward with a solution that resembles more 
Aquinas’ analogy of being than Duns Scotus’ univocity of being.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
7 See e. g. CNE, 1284C; 1288C; 1304D-1305A.  
